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1. Introduction 
 
On one level, corruption appears to be at odds with the prospect of economic development 
(Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). However, some authors have perhaps controversially 
posited the opposite view. One pre-eminent supporter of the notion that corruption can have a 
positive effect on development was Leff (1964), who contended that where the institutional 
framework is not appropriate (in his case, where there are bureaucratic restrictions), 
corruption facilitates trade that would not occur without it. Various authors have responded to 
this assumption, with both theoretical and empirical studies. For example, Mauro (1995) was 
one of the first to demonstrate a significant negative correlation between corruption and 
private investment; in this way corruption reduces economic growth. Academic debate seems 
to be divided between supporters of the positive effect of corruption on economic 
development, who could be termed the ³grease-in-the-wheel´ school, and proponents of the 
negative effect, namely the ³sand-in-the-wheel´ school (Kaufman, Wei, 1999).  
Rather than simply opposing either of these two schools of thought, it is important to 
understand the marginal effect of corruption on economic development, while considering at 
the same time the influence of governance (Méon, Sekkat, 2005). The aim of the present 
paper is to analyze the relationship between institutional quality (synonymous with 
governance herein), corruption level, and economic development. The present research uses 
cross-national data developed by the World Bank and related to perceived levels of 
corruption, institutional framework quality and economic development, in order to test the 
various hypotheses. One particular feature of this paper is thus to investigate the impact of 
both institutional framework quality and corruption on economic development. Furthermore, 
a significant addition to the literature is the use of genuine wealth growth per capita as a 
proxy for economic development, rather than GDP growth per capita (Ehrlich, Lui, 1999). 
The use of this measure is in line with increasing concerns related to sustainable development 
(Arrow et al., 2004; Dasgupta, 2001; Aidt, 2009, 2011). One other original contribution made 
here is the application of the rarely used PLS (Partial Least Squares) structural equation 
modeling to evaluate the proposed scheme. This empirical research supports the µsand-in-the-
wheel¶ perspective.  
 
2. The grease- / sand-in-the-wheel analysis 
 
Many economists have studied the relationship between corruption and economic 
development. As a matter of fact, the usual definition of corruption as ³VDOHRIJRYHUQPHQW
SURSHUW\IRUSULYDWHJDLQ´ (Shleifer, Vishny, 1993) could lead to the intuitive conclusion that 
corruption has a negative influence on economic growth. When civil servants make decisions 
based purely on their own personal interests, their decisions are not likely to be of benefit to 
society. However, rather than there being general agreement on this matter, two opposing 
views have developed, which diverge on the question of whether or not corruption is harmful 
to an economy. 
 
To use an expression first coined by Kaufman and Wei (1999), some scholars contend that 
FRUUXSWLRQLV³JUHDVHLQWKHZKHHORIFRPPHUFH´The view that corruption can be ³efficiency-
enhancing´ is an old strand in the economic literature (Aidt, 2003). In the 1960s, Leff (1964) 
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provocatively stated that bureaucratic corruption helps economic development. To support 
this view, various authors have provided both theoretical arguments (Lui, 1985; Acemoglu, 
Verdier, 2000) and empirical evidence (Egger, Winner, 2005). Three main explanations have 
been given for the potential positive influence of corruption on economic development. First 
it has been suggested that bribes attract a better quality of civil servant. In a developing 
country where civil servants are poorly paid, bribes constitute a supplementary salary that 
makes it possible to recruit better civil servants (Leys, 1964). Civil servants of a higher 
'caliber' can make better economic decisions and accelerate bureaucratic processes, helping to 
break down barriers to investment for entrepreneurs and hence leading to more economic 
development. Second, corruption could allow bureaucratic procedures to be speeded up. For 
example, Lui developed a model showing that corruption could shorten the length of time 
spent in queues (1985). Bribes could thus be an incentive for civil servants to accelerate an 
administrative system in which performance is generally poor (Lui, 1985). Corruption could 
also be necessary to bypass regulatory and bureaucratic constraints (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; 
Huntington, 1968). Finally, corruption could introduce an element of competition for 
government resources, and such competition could lead to government services being offered 
more efficiently than without it (Beck, Maher, 1986 ; Aidt, 2003). In general terms, the 
central argument of the grease-in-the-wheel view is that corruption allows economic agents to 
overcome bad policy, complicated regulations, or inefficient bureaucracy. 
 
The opposite school of thought has argued that corruption limits economic development 
through the ³VDQG-in-the-ZKHHO´of economic development (Buchanan, Tullock, 1962; Ades, 
Di Tella, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). For example, Frie and Vishny described the 
³JUDEELQJ KDQG´ of government consisting of a large number of substantially independent 
bureaucrats pursuing their own agendas, taking bribes, and causing economic decline (1997).  
 
The arguments in favour of the sand-in-the-wheel view are that corruption implies the poor 
allocation of resources, an increase in economic restrictions or less investment, and therefore 
economic decline. On the one hand, the most important loss in economic growth linked to 
corruption is due to the inefficient allocation of resources (Svensson, 2005). Corruption, of 
course, distorts the decision-making processes of officials (Ministers or civil servants), who 
may be more likely to support investments associated with higher bribes than those associated 
with higher economic output.  For example, a civil servant may select a project to build a 
highway that is unnecessary for a given region and not linked with any form of economic 
growth, just because (s)he will receive a larger bribe from some of the economic agents 
involved. In such situations, corruption results in the poor allocation of resources and 
therefore slower economic development. Tanzi and Davoodi showed that higher corruption is 
associated with higher public investment in less productive areas (1997), leading to economic 
decline.  
 
On the other hand, the possibility of a bribe may be an incentive to create restrictions to 
economic development (Kurer, 1993). Such restrictions are not exogenous to the system but 
rather ³SDUW RI WKH EXLOW-in corrupt practices of a patron-FOLHQW SROLWLFDO V\VWHP´ (Bardhan, 
1997). A civil servant may create distortions in order to have an opportunity to extort a bribe 
(Myrdal, 1968).  
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Furthermore, corruption could imply less private investment, and therefore slower economic 
growth (Mauro, 1995). Mo (2001) found that corruption reduces the level of human capital 
and private investment. Corruption could be a barrier to investors, with less investment 
leading to slower economic growth. Murphy et al. (1993) pointed out that entrepreneurs may 
invest less in a country where bribery is rife. This argument is especially pertinent here, 
because entrepreneurs need investors to sustain their risky projects and are thus vulnerable 
targets for dishonest predators (Murphy et al. 1993).  Similarly, a high level of corruption 
negatively affects foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000; Javorcik, Wei, 2009) and 
consequently also has a detrimental effect on economic development. Wei showed that 
economic agents accustomed to operating in transparent environments find it difficult to 
overcome the administrative complexities of corrupt environments, and may therefore avoid 
investing in highly corrupt countries (2006). Hines (1985) showed that US FDI (Foreign, 
Direct Investment) is mostly directed to less corrupt countries (1985).  
 
Rather than opposing either of the two foregoing perspectives, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) 
questioned whether the relationship between corruption and growth is causal, or whether it is 
the result of a third factor. Indeed, an implicit hypothesis of the proponents of the grease-in-
the-wheel view concerns the contingent circumstances of the relationship between corruption 
and economic growth. Leff (1964) argued that increased corruption leads to faster economic 
growth when regulation and bureaucratic restrictions exist. The grease-in-the-wheel view 
states that corruption is only beneficial when various aspects of governance are missing (Aidt, 
2009). The 'grease- vs. sand-in-the-wheel' debate is therefore not just about the link between 
corruption and economic growth. Indeed, scholarly discussion should question whether 
corruption has a positive or negative influence on investment when the quality of the 
governance is poor (Méon, Sekkat, 2005; Aidt, 2009). Therefore, to test the hypotheses of 
grease vs. sand, it is necessary to examine the connections between the quality of governance, 
corruption and economic growth (Méon, Sekkat, 2005). Herein, governance and institutional 
framework are taken to be synonymous. Institutions are defined as ³WKH KXPDQO\ GHILQHG
FRQVWUDLQWV WKDW VWUXFWXUH SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQV´ (North, 1991). The 
institutional environment or framework is then a set of relevant institutions. An example of 
the way in which institutions influence corruption is via regulation. A given country could 
have a low quality of institutional framework when it has ineffective administration or 
cumbersome bureaucracy. Mo (2001) showed that the impact of corruption on economic 
growth is insignificant when various control variables such as political rights are taken into 
account. Following this line of argument, Méon and Sekkat (2005) demonstrated that the 
marginal effect of corruption on economic growth is conditional on the quality of governance. 
The present argument is that a poorer institutional quality increases the level of corruption, 
which in turn has a negative influence on economic growth. Furthermore, the quality of the 
institutional framework also has a direct influence on economic development. 
 
3. Model and Data 
 
From the foregoing theoretical development, the model is: 
Corruption = Į¶Į¶,QVWLWXWLRQVȝ¶ 
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and Economic Development = Į + Į1 Corruption + Į2 Institutions +ȝ 
Where :  
³(FRQRPLF'HYHORSPHQW´LVWKHJURZWKRIan economy (a discussion of this concept follows). 
³&RUUXSWLRQ´LVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISHUFHLYHGFRUUXSWLRQLQa country, 
³,QVWLWXWLRQs´refer to the quality of the institutions in a country, 
ȝand ȝ¶DUHHUURUWHUPV 
 
The hypotheses are then: 
H1: the higher the quality of the institutional framework, the less corruption there is in a 
country, 
H2: the higher the quality of the institutional framework, the higher the economic 
development in a country, 
H3: the less corruption there is, the higher the economic development in a country. 
 
To test these hypotheses, we used data from 4 different years: 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007. 
The years were selected to cover a period of a decade, using cross-national data collected by 
the World Bank from various countries with low and high quality institutions. We used year 
dummies in our analyses. Because the year of observation had no effect on the results, we 
decided not to use the year dummies in the tables included here. Originally, the number of 
countries surveyed varied for the different years because there were some missing values for 
certain countries in different years. Various methods may be used as part of a structural 
equation modeling approach to deal with missing values. In the present study, any missing 
values were suppressed, yielding a total of 120 countries in the final sample, as listed in Table 
1. 
 
Many authors have researched the link between corruption and economic development, using 
GDP per capita to measure economic growth (Mauro, 1995;  Ehrlich, Lui, 1999;  Tanzi, 
Davoodi, 2001). However, as stated by Aidt (2009) ³HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW LV DERXW
VXVWDLQDEOHLPSURYHPHQWVLQKXPDQZHOIDUHDQG*'3SHUFDSLWDLVQRWDPHDVXUHRI WKLV´. 
Since the publication of the findings of the Brundtland Commission in 1987, various authors 
have highlighted the importance of sustainable development (Dasgupta, 2001; Hamilton, 
2002; Arrow et al., 2003). Sustainable development has been defined as ³GHYHORSPHQW WKDW
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to 
PHHW WKHLU RZQ QHHGV´ (Arrow et al. 2004: 150). Hamilton stressed that indicators of 
sustainable development should include all forms of capital (not just produced capital) and 
XVHGWKHQWKHWHUP³JHQXLQH´0HDVXUHVof genuine savings are broader measures than 
net savings by taking into account the changes in natural resources base and environmental 
quality (Hamilton, Clemens, 1999). Genuine investment (or genuine savings in this article) is 
expressed in a simplistic way as the sum of the values of investments or disinvestments in 
each of capital assets (the value of each investment being the product of the change in the 
quantity of the asset times the shadow value or accounting price of that asset)(Arrow, et al. 
2004). The World Bank (WB) publishes a measure of genuine investment (called the 
$GMXVWHG 1HW 6DYLQJV $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH :% ³Adjusted net savings are derived from 
standard national accounting measures of gross national savings by making four types of 
adjustments. First, estimates of capital consumption of produced assets are deducted to obtain 
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net national savings. Then current expenditures on education are added to net domestic 
savings as an appropriate value of investments in human capital. Next, estimates of the 
depletion of a variety of natural resources are deducted to reflect the decline in asset values 
associated with their extraction and harvest. Finally, pollution damages are deducted. WB 
estimates health damages due to urban air pollution. As for global pollution damages, the 
HVWLPDWHVLQFOXGHGDPDJHVIURPFDUERQGLR[LGHHPLVVLRQV´ 
Critical appraisals of the genuine savings as an indicator of sustainable development could be 
found in Neumayer (1999 / 2010), Arrow et al. (2004) or Dietz et al. (2006). 
A first weakness of this measure is to consider the population as constant. One can envisage a 
situation in which the genuine investment is positive, but if population is growing at an even 
faster rate, then per capita wealth will actually be decreasing (Dasgupta, 2001; Hamilton, 
2002, Dietz, Neumayer, 2006). A second issue concerns the fact that a wide array of capital 
assets is missing in national accounts such as human capital and natural capital. Considering 
both weaknesses, Arrow (2003, 2004) has proposed to transform the estimation of genuine 
investment as a growth in genuine wealth per capita by dividing by the gross national income 
(GNI), multiplying by a wealth ration (0.2 for industrialized countries or 0.15 for developing 
and oil-rich countries) and after removing the population growth.  
Following the indications of Arrow et al. (2004) and following the work of Aidt (2009, 2011), 
we thus measure genuine economic development:  ED = (ANS x WR) - PG 
Where ED is a measure of Economic Development calculated using:  
- ANS, the growth in genuine wealth per capita = 
(Adjusted net savings, excluding particulate emission damage, % of GNI) 
(NY.ADJ.SVNX.GN.ZS),  
- WR, the Wealth Ratio (0.2 for industrialized countries or 0.15 for developing and oil-
rich countries), 
and PG, Population Growth (in %) (SP.POP.GROW). 
 
Another challenge for our research is to obtain reliable empirical measurements for corruption 
(Bardhan, 1997; Kaufman, 1998). Difficulties with empirical data have kept the subject of 
corruption out of economic research for some time (Ades, Di Tella, 1999). Many economists 
use indices that measure corruption by asking respondents to score a country according to the 
likelihood of civil servants being willing to accept bribes (Mauro, 1995; Aidt, 2009). Despite 
the weaknesses of such types of perception index, they are widely used. Herein, corruption is 
measured using the inverse of the control of corruption index developed by the World Bank 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005).  
 
Various measures of the quality of the institutional framework have been proposed in the 
economic literature, including law enforcement quality (Becker, Stigler, 1974), central 
government quality (Schleifer, Vishny, 1993), regulation quality (Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-
Lobaton, 1998) and political freedom (Méndez, Sepùlveda, 2006). We use the 'governance 
indicators' of the World Bank. Among these, the 'voice and accountability' indicator measures 
the extent to which DFRXQWU\¶s citizens can participate in the selection of their government, in 
addition to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. The 'political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism' indicator measures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
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including domestic violence and terrorism. 'Government effectiveness' measures the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
RI WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQW WR VXFKSROLFLHV 'Regulatory quality' is used to assess the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. The final governance indicator 'rule of law' 
evaluates the extent to which economic agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts; this 
indicator also measures the likelihood of crime and violence.  Due to their recognisable 
quality, these World Bank indicators are widely used in the economic literature on corruption. 
Aidt (2009) thus used various indicators such as the Voice and Accountability Index to 
evaluate the quality of institutions (2009); Méon and Sekkat used all of them (2005). In view 
of 1RUWKµV (1991) definition of institutions, it is clear that the concept of institutions 
encompasses various components including thH ³5XOH RI /DZ´ RU ³Government 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV´  
As a consequence, institutional quality is measured herein using a combination of the five 
governance indicators discussed above. Rather than using them separately, PLS structural 
equation modeling makes it possible to combine them into a single measure of the quality of 
the institutional framework. The quality of the Institutional framework is then considered as a 
latent variable, built from 5 different governance indicators. We divided our 120 countries 
into two subsamples using an average of the 5 governance indicators for each country for a 
given year. Countries with an average governance indicator of less than zero were classified 
as countries with poor quality institutions, while those with an average governance indicator 
above zero were classified as countries with high quality institutions.  
 
4. Data analysis 
To test the model, we use the Structural Equation Modelling technique known as PLS, or 
Partial Least Squares, which was first developed by Wold (1982, 1985). PLS is based on an 
iterative combination of principal component analysis and regression. Usually, structural 
equation modelling (SEM) is used to test complex theoretical models where many variables 
have various correlations (Hershberger et al. 2003 ; Tenenhaus et al., 2005).  Models tested 
with SEM should be theoretical models. Thus in our case, we have built a model to be tested 
on a strong theoretical literature review. The aim of using PLS is to explain the variance of 
the constructs in the model (Chin, 1998; Tenenhaus, 2008; Barclay, Higgins, Thompson, 
1995). PLS has rarely been previously employed in the economic literature to study 
corruption, and its use represents an important contribution of this paper. The use of PLS in 
this survey has numerous advantages (Chin, 1998; Marcoulides, Schumacker, 1996), one of 
which is its ability to test relationships among all the variables involved. It makes it possible 
to estimate the relationships between the exogenous and endogenous variables (Tenenhaus et 
al., 2005). The technique is most useful for explaining and predicting the endogenous latent 
variables (Ringle, Sarsted, Straub, 2012). Secondly, PLS requires no assumptions to be made 
regarding multivariate normality (Hulland, 1999). Thirdly, PLS may be used with relatively 
small samples (Chin, Newsted, 1999). However, over a certain threshold, Chin et al. (2003) 
2551
Economics Bulletin, 2013, Vol. 33 No. 4 pp. 2545-2562
 
 
GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW WKH LQFUHDVH RI WKH VDPSOH VL]H GRHVQ¶W VLJQLILFDQWO\ PRGLI\ WKH 6(0¶V
results (2003). Fourthly, SEM is especially effective in testing models that include latent 
constructs that are being measured with multiple indicators, such as the latent variable 
'Institutions' is this paper. Instead of OLS, the PLS method has then been chosen since it 
allows to estimate a network of causal relationships, defined according to a theoretical model, 
linking variables including some latent complex concepts. For example, a latent complex 
concept is the quality of the institutions, a latent concept measured by 5 governance 
indicators. In this paper, the software XLSTAT version 2010 was used to perform the PLS 
analysis.  
 
A PLS model must be analyzed in 2 stages. Firstly, the adequacy of the measures is assessed 
by paying attention to the reliability of the individual measures and the discriminant validity 
of the constructs (Hulland, 1999). The construct 'Institutions' is built using 5 indicators. PLS 
provides statistics to evaluate the reliability and validity of the constructs using various 
indicators. The reliability of each item is controlled by studying the loadings of the measures 
on their corresponding construct. Each item loading of scales measuring the construct 
'Institutions' is greater than 0.663, the maximum being 0.969 (Carmines, Zeller, 1979; See 
Table 4).  As shown in 7DEOHWKHFRQVWUXFW
,QVWLWXWLRQV
KDVD&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDJUHDWHUWKDQ
WKH WKUHVKROG RI  VXJJHVWHG LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH +HUH WKH PLQLPXP YDOXH RI &URQEDFK¶V
alpha is 0.818. Construct reliability is also evaluated using Dillon-*ROGVWHLQ¶VUKR+HUHrho 
is higher than 0.875 (See Table 5). This indicates a high degree of reliability of individual 
items. In addition, both an exploratory and a confirmatory factor analysis (EFA) were 
performed across the 5 items. The high level of convergent validity (well above 50%) 
confirms the validity of incorporating all 5 items into one measure of the quality of the 
institutions. Moreover, a discriminant validity test indicates that the latent dimension labeled 
³,QVWLWXWLRQV´ VKDUHV PRUH YDULDQFH ZLWK LWV UHVSHFWLYH indicators than with the two other 
variables with which it is correlated. This proves that discriminant validity is achieved 
(Fornell, Larcker, 1981).  
 
The next step is to evaluate the structural model. The model is evaluated on the basis of the 
strength of the indicator loadings, R² values and the significance of the structural path (Chin, 
1998). In addition, permutation tests attest that for the 2 samples (countries with low or high 
quality institutions) the measurement variable loadings remain invariant, lending support to 
the overall stability and validity of the proposed model.  
A particular emphasis is made in the evaluation of a structural model on the R². Indeed, the 
ability of the model to explain the endogenous variable is estimated by the coefficient of 
determination R². The R² shows the % of the variance explained by the model. It is important 
to give the R² for each dependent variable and also the % of contribution to the overall R² 
(Chin, 1998).  
Furthermore, the evaluation of the model requires looking at the standardized regression 
coefficients (i.e., path coefficients). The path coefficients are the estimated values for path 
relationships in the structural model and should be evaluated in terms of sign, magnitude, and 
significance. The path coefficients can be interpreted as standardized beta coefficients of 
ordinary least squares regressions. Structural paths, whose sign is in keeping with a priori 
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postulated algebraic signs, provide a partial empirical validation of the theoretically assumed 
relationships between latent variables (Chin, 1998)(Tennenhaus, et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, it is important to look at the predictive relevance of the structural equation 
model. Indeed, the predictive relevance of the model could be assessed using the Stone-
*HLVVHU¶V4ðNQRZn as the cross-validated redundancy index (Stone, 1974 ; Geisser, 1974 ; 
Tenenhaus et al., 2005). For the different samples (countries with low quality institutions, 
high quality institutions, and all countries), the Q² was always superior to 0 (See tables 6 and 
7). This indicates the predictive relevance of the model (Stone, 1974 ; Geisser, 1974 ; Wold, 
1982). In addition, a global criterion of goodness of fit (Gof) has been developed (Tennenhaus 
et al., 2005 ; Vinzi, 2010). The Gof index is a measure for the overall prediction performance 
of the model (equal to the geometric mean of the average communality index and the average 
R² value) (Vinzi et al., 2010). In our model, all the Gof indexes are superior to 0.713, which 
shows a very good prediction performance of our model (See table 7). 
Cross-correlations of all variables used in this research are given in Tables 2 and 3 for the two 
samples of the analysis (countries with low and high quality institutions). The cross-
correlation matrices provide support for the hypotheses. For all samples, the various measures 
of institutions are negatively and significantly correlated with the level of corruption. The 
various measures of the institutional framework are also significantly and positively 
correlated with economic development. Finally, the level of corruption is negatively and 
significantly correlated with economic development. 
The results of the PLS analysis are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Regardless of the sample 
(countries with low or high quality institutions, or all countries), all the hypotheses are 
supported. The first hypothesis concerns the link between the quality of the institutions and 
the level of corruption. R² is very high, with a minimum of 0.543, which means that more 
than 50% of the variance of the variable 'Institutions' is explained by the variation of the 
variable 'Corruption'. The path coefficient is always negative (p>.05) and very high, with a 
minimum of -0.728. Hypothesis H1 is then supported. Thus, a higher quality of institutional 
framework implies a lower level of corruption. This negative correlation is higher for 
countries with high quality institutions than for countries with low quality institutions.  
 
The second hypothesis relates to the influence of the institutional framework on the level of 
economic development. Hypothesis H2 is supported with a path coefficient of at least 0.175 
(p>.05). A higher quality of institutional framework implies more economic development. It 
should be noted that the effect of the quality of institution on economic development is higher 
when the country has a low quality of institutions than when the country has a high quality of 
institutions.  
 
The final hypothesis H3 concerns the link between corruption and economic development, 
and is supported. The path coefficient between the two variables is at least -0.146 (p>.05), and 
R² ranges from 0.102 to 0.249. In countries with low quality institutions, both the institutional 
quality and the corruption level explain nearly 25% of the variance of the economic 
development. The PLS approach also provides a contribution to the R² from all the variables 
in the model. In terms of contribution to R², the institutional framework and the influence of 
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corruption are similar to that of economic development. The contribution to R² is around 50% 
for the quality of the institutional framework (49.7% in countries with low quality institutions 
and 55.3% in countries with high quality institutions) and around 40% for corruption (46.9% 
in countries with low quality institutions and 38.7% in countries with high quality 
institutions). In countries with both lower and higher qualities of institutions, the quality of 
the institutions and the level of corruption influence economic development. However, the 
effect is higher in countries with low quality institutions. Improving the quality of institutions 
and reducing corruption have more effect on economic development in countries with lower 
quality institutions than in countries with higher quality ones. These results therefore support 
the sand-in-the-wheel perspective. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The question of the effect of corruption on economic growth is of considerable importance. 
Some authors have proposed a view of corruption as grease in the wheel of economic 
development (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). Fraudulent behaviour such as corruption is then 
cynically seen to be of benefit to an economy. At the same time, theoretical and empirical 
papers have demonstrated the harmful effect of corruption on economic development. 
However, econometric results have not always been that robust, and have sometimes been 
contradictory. If some empirical studies have given opposite results, it is because the research 
has not considered an important element in studying the relationship between corruption and 
economic development, namely the institutional framework quality (Méon, Sekkat, 2005; 
Aidt, 2009). We contend that supporters of the grease-in-the-wheel view only consider the 
beneficial effect of corruption on economic development when institutions are of low quality, 
such as when regulation restricts trade. Following this view, the present paper has assessed 
the effect of both corruption and institutions on economic development. Using a PLS 
structural equation modeling method, our cross-national data lend support to the sand-in-the-
wheel theory, in that both corruption and institutional framework quality negatively affect 
economic development. One key finding is that institutions affect development both directly 
and indirectly through their influence on corruption. One limitation of this paper is to consider 
all types of institutions altogether.  Following the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis, a future 
research should look at the relationship between the various types of institutions (such as 
economic / political institutions), corruption and sustainable development (Acemoglu et al., 
2005; Aidt, 2011, Flachaire et al. 2013). Furthermore, one interesting aspect of this paper is 
its support of this theory, using a measure of sustainable economic development. Indeed, 
taking advantage of research on sustainable development (Dasgupta, 2001; Hamilton, 2002; 
Arrow, Dasgupta, Mäler, 2003), and contrary to other research that uses GDP growth per 
capita (Mauro, 1995; Méon, Sekkat, 2005), this empirical research uses genuine wealth per 
capita as a measure of economic development. As claimed by Aidt, development involves 
sustainable improvements in human welfare, and the commonly used economic measure 
(GDP per capita) is not appropriate (2009); in the end all that matters is that the development 
is sustainable. 
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Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo Dem. Rep., Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South  Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zambia. 
Table 1. List of the 120 countries. 
 
Variables Corruption Voice Pol Gov Reg Rule 
Economic 
Development 
Corruption 1.000       
Voice -0.394 1.000      
Pol -0.414 0.308 1.000     
Gov -0.758 0.517 0.372 1.000    
Reg -0.533 0.644 0.295 0.744 1.000   
Rule -0.810 0.470 0.486 0.807 0.630 1.000  
Economic 
Development -0.451 0.331 0.197 0.485 0.411 0.433 1.000 
Table 2. Cross-correlations between the variables for countries with low quality institutions. 
Number of observations = 284. 
 
Variables Corruption Voice Pol Gov Reg Rule 
Economic 
Development 
Corruption  1.000       
Voice -0.717 1.000      
Pol -0.662 0.632 1.000     
Gov -0.946 0.741 0.617 1.000    
Reg -0.806 0.743 0.484 0.875 1.000   
Rule -0.954 0.756 0.706 0.945 0.818 1.000  
Economic 
Development -0.271 0.230 0.388 0.291 0.273 0.309 1.000 
Table 3. Cross-correlations between the variables for countries with high quality 
institutions. Number of observations = 196. 
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Sample  Countries 
with Low 
Quality 
Institutions 
  Countries 
with High 
Quality 
Institutions 
 
Number of 
observations 
 284   196  
Variables Mean S.D. Cross-
loadings 
Mean S.D. Cross-
loadings 
Corruption  0.699 0.407 1 -0.921 0.844 1 
Voice and 
accountability -0.693 0.570 0.724 0.907 0.552 0.843 
Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence -0.725 0.718 0.663 0.706 0.458 0.724 
Government 
effectiveness -0.630 0.437 0.862 0.984 0.718 0.969 
Regulatory 
quality -0.564 0.535 0.829 0.922 0.613 0.902 
Rule of law -0.740 0.445 0.858 0.889 0.685 0.968 
Economic 
Development  -1.084 2.950 
1 
1.405 1.469 
1 
Table 4. Description of the variables. 
Construct Number of items 
&URQEDFK¶V
alpha 
Rho of Dillon-
Goldstein 
Counties with low quality institutions 5 0.818 0.875 
Counties with high quality institutions 5 0.932 0.958 
All countries 5 0.966 0.974 
7DEOH&RPSRVLWHUHOLDELOLW\RIWKHYDULDEOH³,QVWLWXWLRQV´ 
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Countries with 
Low Quality 
Institutions 
Countries with 
High Quality 
Institutions 
All Countries 
R²  = 0.543 0.887 0.890 
Q² = 0.538 0.869 0.890 
Path Coefficient ȕ  (between 
Institutions and Corruption (H1) 
= 
 
-0.728 
 
-0.944 
 
-0.943 
Contribution to R² = 
 
98.5% 
100% 
 
99.9% 
Table 6. Results of Partial Least Squares Analysis concerning the link between the quality 
of the institutions and the level of corruption. P < 0.05 
 
 
Countries with 
Low Quality 
Institutions 
Countries with 
High Quality 
Institutions 
All Countries 
R²  = 0.249 0.102 0.299 
Q² = 0.241 0.083 0.295 
Gof = 0.752 0.713 0.795 
Path Coefficient ȕ  (between 
Corruption and Economic 
Development)(H2) = 
0.267 0.175 0.288 
Contribution to R² of the variable 
corruption = 49.7% 55.3% 53.7% 
Path Coefficient ȕ  (between 
Institutions and Economic 
Development)(H3) = 
-0.259 -0.146 -0.266 
Contribution to R² of the variable 
institutions = 46.9% 38.7% 45.9% 
Table 7. Results of Partial Least Squares Analysis concerning the link between the quality 
of the institutions, the level of corruption and the economic development. P < 0.05 
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